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The objective of this theological battle is to confront IS soft power 
projection into Muslim communities around the world. This is a crucial 
battle to be engaged in South Africa, and South Africa’s Muslim community 
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Syrian people in a refugee camp in Suruc, Turkey. These people are refugees from Kobane who escaped from an attack by ISIS.
35V o l u m e  6 6  /  2 0 1 5
INTERNATIONAL
A number of scholars and commentators have recently come to the conclusion that the 
Islamic State group currently terrorising 
parts of Iraq and Syria has substantially 
established itself on the ground so that 
it is, in Patrick Cockburn’s words, ‘fast 
becoming an established geographic 
and political fact on the map’. With 
its brutality, spectacular military 
victories, internet presence that will 
leave many a spin doctor envious, and 
well thought-out military strategies, the 
group has managed to capture and 
hold a substantial amount of territory 
in the two Middle East countries. The 
challenge posed by this development, 
however, transcends the region and 
has already had an impact on South 
Africa and other African countries.
ISIS origins; thanks US
The Islamic State of Iraq and Sham 
(an Arabic term which approximates 
the Levant), now calling itself ‘Islamic 
State’, originated in Jordan as Jama'at 
al-Tawhid wal-Jihad in 1999. It 
deployed its fighters to Iraq after the 
2003 US-led invasion and subsequent 
occupation of Iraq, and subsequently, 
in 2004, affiliated to the global 
Al-Qa'ida network. The USA, indeed, 
has a great deal of responsibility for 
the creation of ISIS and its current 
actions. Its occupation of Iraq and 
other repeated mistakes aided in 
the coalescing of jihadists in ISIS. 
These include the US mollycoddling 
of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, two 
American allies that played a major 
role in developing the ideologies and 
organisational capacity of ISIS-type 
groups, and the US targeting of the 
wrong countries and role players for 
the 9/11 attacks. 
Over the course of its history it 
has assumed for itself many names, 
including Al-Qa'ida in Mesopotamia 
(often referred to in the media as ‘Al-
Qa'ida in Iraq’). It was always regarded, 
even within Al-Qa'ida circles, as being 
unnecessarily brutal and overstepping 
the limits of acceptable behaviour. In 
2006, together with a number of other 
anti-occupation groups, it formed the 
‘Mujahideen Shura Council’, which 
later formed ‘the Islamic State of 
Iraq (ISI)’. The current leader, Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi took control of the 
organisation in 2010. After the Syrian 
uprising had become a civil war in 2011, 
Baghdadi send representatives to Syria 
to start an ISI branch there, which was 
subsequently called Jabhat al-Nusra. 
In 2013, he announced that ISI and 
Nusra had merged to form Islamic 
State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS), a move 
that was rejected by Nusra and, later, 
the Al-Qa'ida leadership. That resulted 
in ISIS breaking from Al-Qa'ida early 
in 2014, developing its own extremist 
ideology and changing its strategy. Its 
targets in Syria included government 
forces as well as opposition groups, 
with the latter losing a great number of 
people to ISIS’s terror campaign.
Under Baghdadi’s leadership, over 
time, the group attracted (or was 
infiltrated by) a number of former 
officers from Saddam Hussein’s 
Ba'athist army who had melted away 
into Iraq’s desert, cities and towns 
after the US occupation. They have 
provided the strongest contributions 
to IS’s military strategy and tactics, 
and with laying the groundwork for 
successfully executing the group’s 
recent strategy in Iraq. This strategy 
captured the global imagination when 
IS spectacularly exploded onto the 
scene with its takeover of Iraq’s second 
largest city, Mosul, in June 2014. Within 
a hundred days, it upturned politics 
in the region, and – on the ground if 
not on the map – erased a good part 
of the border between Syria and Iraq. 
It used the opportunity to declare a 
global ‘caliphate’ with Baghdadi as the 
‘caliph’. This declaration was one of 
the departures of ISIS from Al-Qa'ida’s 
strategy. Having gained control of 
territory and forseeing the possibility 
of actually ruling over that territory, the 
group renamed itself Islamic State.
Mosul and the formation of a 
pseudo-state
Many observers were shocked at 
the rapidity (in less than 24 hours) 
of the fall of Mosul, a city with 2.5 
million people, to IS. However, those 
who had been observing Iraq closely 
were not entirely surprised. It was not 
a shock that such a militia was able 
to obtain the support of Iraqi Sunni 
tribes to vanquish the Iraqi army, or 
that the army so shamefully retreated 
in the face of a much smaller force. 
Since then, ISIS has used the fact that 
it was fighting in both Syria and Iraq 
to its advantage, carefully identifying 
targets in alternate countries, gaining 
victories, and punishing its opposition 
– whether state armies or other militias 
– in the process. In Iraq it has mainly 
been fighting against the Iraqi army, 
various Shi'a militias, and the Kurdish 
Peshmerga (the army of the Kurdistan 
Regional Government in Iraq) and 
YPG (People’s Protection Units in the 
Kurdish area of Rojava in Syria). In 
Syria, it has been battling the YPG, 
various Syrian rebel groups (including, 
at some times, the al-Qa'ida-affiliated 
Jabhat al-Nusra), and the Syrian army. 
When, in May this year, IS took control 
of the capital city of Iraq’s Anbar 
province, Ramadi, the event was not 
greeted with the same shock as in 
June 2014 – even though the Ramadi 
operation was subjected to, and 
survived, seven airstrikes launched by 
the USA to protect the city.
Is IS winning?
While the control of territory in 
much of the area where IS has been 
operating – especially in the peripheries 
– is fluid and could change hands from 
one day to the next, the fact is that, in 
general, IS seems to be winning the 
battle against its array of enemies. It 
also exercises its rule over about ten 
million people. Indeed, its measure of 
success is not like that of an insurgent 
group, but, rather, like that of a state. 
As Afro-Middle East Centre researcher 
Omar Shaukat has pointed out, the 
group measures victory by its ability 
to hold and maintain control over the 
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core of the territory it has captured, 
provide services to the population in 
this area (as it is doing), and not being 
militarily defeated. And there seems to 
be little chance of it being defeated in 
the near future. 
This is due to a range of factors: its 
enemies seem to be weaker; enemy 
soldiers or fighters are not well-
equipped (Iraqi soldiers and Syrian 
opposition fighters), or do not have the 
same level of commitment (Iraqi and 
Syrian soldiers); the enemy is plagued 
by corruption (the Iraqi military); or the 
enemy is one that does not necessarily 
seek IS’s destruction (the USA). Writing 
about the prospect of IS establishing 
a state, Stephen Walt argued: ‘An 
Islamic State victory would mean 
that the group retained power in the 
areas it now controls and successfully 
defied outside efforts to “degrade and 
destroy” it.’ While degrading the group 
is a real possibility, destroying it does 
not have much chance of success if all 
the forces arraigned against it are not 
aiming for that goal. 
Another factor that has been useful 
for, and has been effectively used by, 
IS is sectarianism, which has played 
a significant role in boosting the 
group’s successes. The marginalisation 
and neglect of the Iraqi Sunni 
community by the Shi'a-dominated 
central government of Iraq’s previous 
president, Nuri al-Maliki, and the 
increasing sectarianisation of the crisis 
in Syria (even if the original uprising 
there was not based on sectarianism) 
have contributed significantly to the 
group’s successes. Using the sectarian 
card has also been key to IS recruitment 
around the world. The group has 
presented itself as the only force able 
to defend Muslims, and, importantly, 
to defend Sunni Muslims and Sunnism 
against Shi'as and Shiism. In this, it has 
ridden on the coattails of Saudi Arabia 
which helped paint the Syrian crisis 
(and now the Yemeni crisis) as a battle 
of Sunnis against Shi'a expansionism. 
Saudi Arabia raised this sectarian flag; 
IS has announced itself as being better 
able to fight this battle than Saudi 
Arabia. Thus, a not-so-quiet battle is 
raging between the Saudis and IS for 
sectarian Sunni support, and recent IS 
attacks in Saudi Arabia should be seen 
in this light.
However, the notion of maintaining 
control over territory in the Iraq-Syria 
theatre is IS’s minimalist position. It 
also wants to expand in other parts 
of the region. These twin objectives 
are encapsulated in its slogan: ‘The 
Islamic State remains; The Islamic 
State expands’. This ‘expansion’ is not 
in terms of controlling a contiguous 
political entity that stretches from Iraq 
to Tunisia. Instead, its core Iraq-Syria 
theatre of operations will be its state, 
while its other areas of operations – 
Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen – will 
be satellites which play a role in terms 
of recruitment as well as in terms 
of disrupting its regional and global 
enemies.
Its ‘success’ is also determined by 
whether it can convince Muslims from 
all over the world to migrate to its 
territory, not only as fighters, but also 
as ‘settlers’. This objective ties in with 
its determination to redraw the map 
of the Middle East, and undermine the 
1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement between 
the UK and France (with Russia as 
willing participant) which defined these 
superpowers’ spheres of influence in 
the Middle East in the event that the 
Ottoman Empire was defeated. The 
map of the region since 1920 has more 
or less accorded with that agreement. 
ISIS leader Abu Bakr Baghdadi made it 
clear after capturing Mosul that Sykes-
Picot was an ISIS target, vowing that 
‘this blessed advance will not stop until 
we strike the last nail in the coffin of 
the Sykes–Picot conspiracy’. Thus its 
actions could result not only in the 
creation of a new state, but also in 
the fracturing of another (Iraq) into 
separate ethnic or sectarian states. 
While the prospect of the collapse of 
the Sykes-Picot regime is a liberatory 
notion for many in the Middle East, 
IS has ensured that it is couched in a 
potentially bleak and cruel future.
The South African connection
The attempts of IS to recruit from 
within Muslim communities in various 
parts of the world has extended to South 
Africa as well. While it is necessary 
to reject unsubstantiated claims of 
hundreds of South Africans fighting with 
(and dying for) IS, it is also necessary 
to consider the documented cases of 
between 50 and 100 South Africans 
who have moved to IS territory. 
This number has included two 
groups: young men who joined IS to 
fight in its ranks; and families (including 
children) who ‘migrated’ to IS territory. 
In both cases, the reasons for their 
decisions have been varied. However, 
there are two main attractions which 
might be pointed to. First is the 
political attraction. IS is seen by some 
as a force fighting the USA and its Iraqi 
allies (even though IS is not actually 
fighting the USA), and, in the context 
of global Islamophobia and Muslims 
being attacked and killed in various 
countries by states supported by the 
West, IS is viewed by some as the only 
force directly confronting imperialism 
and having successes against it. 
Second is the religious/theological 
reasoning. Potential recruits are 
persuaded that IS has established a 
legitimate ‘caliphate’ and that it is the 
duty of all Muslims to support such a 
political project. Thus, they are told, 
those men of fighting age are duty-
bound to join the IS army and defend 
its state, and other Muslims have a duty 
to migrate to and live in the ‘caliphate’, 
and support its establishment, survival 
and prosperity in whatever way they 
can.
In one case in April, 23 recruits 
from a town outside Johannesburg 
made their way to Turkey, en route to 
Syria. Eleven of them were intercepted 
by Turkish authorities and returned 
to South Africa, into the custody of 
the State Security Agency. There was 
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at least one other case of a young 
man being similarly intercepted and 
returned to the SSA. In all such cases, 
state security, after a brief interrogation 
of the ‘returnees’, released them. In 
meetings with representatives of the 
Muslim community, State Security 
minister David Mahlobo explained the 
government’s view that none of those 
returned had committed an illegal act, 
and therefore could not be charged 
by the state. While the government 
held a dim opinion of the actions of 
these recruits, he argued, the primary 
responsibility for deterring recruitment 
and discouraging potential recruits 
from joining IS lay with the Muslim 
community, not with government. 
The main battle, he seemed to be 
suggesting, was not legal or political, 
but religious/ideological and social, 
and while he was personally willing 
to assist, government was not in 
the business of changing people’s 
religious ideas – a responsibility that 
should be shouldered by the Muslim 
community.
South Africa’s Muslim community 
seems to agree with the minister, and 
sections from within it have taken a 
number of steps to act in that direction. 
The April incident came as a shock to 
many Muslims, and spurred some into 
action. Among their responses were a 
common sermon issued to mosques 
across the country to be presented 
at the Friday prayer, and a media 
release that referred to the 23 and 
the view of the community on the 
issue. Beyond these public responses, 
there were also other responses which 
were internal to the community. 
A number of public meetings and 
lectures were held in mosques and 
community halls, publications were 
issued, articles published, and radio 
and television shows on Muslim media 
focused on the issue. The thrust was 
not only to condemn, but to engage 
in a conversation that went beyond 
condemnation and addressed the 
specific theological arguments that 
IS uses and which have proven to be 
effective in its recruitment.
It is too early to judge how significant 
an impact these measures have had. The 
potential for impact will also depend 
on the whether Muslim community 
organisations will continue pursuing 
this matter or will slacken off when the 
media spotlight is off them, and whether 
they are able to make a stronger case 
to South African Muslim youth than IS 
recruiters do. They will have to address 
both the theological as well as the 
political angles in their attempt to do 
so. Importantly, too, they will have to 
address the meaning of citizenship and 
the ownership and belonging that go 
with that in a modern nation state.
A threat to South Africa?
While South Africans joining IS (or 
settling in IS territory) is not necessarily 
a direct threat to South Africa, there 
are a number of concerns for South 
Africans around this phenomenon. 
One of them is the possibility that some 
recruits might decide to return to South 
Africa. Based on IS’s current strategy, 
there is little chance that South Africa 
would be considered a target for IS 
operations – especially if the state 
does not join any initiative specifically 
targeting IS. Returnees, therefore, 
are unlikely to conduct operations 
in South Africa, but could include 
recruits who are specifically deployed 
by their IS chiefs to return and further 
the recruitment process, and, second, 
those who make the decision to return 
after the initial romanticism of IS and 
the notion of living in a ‘caliphate’ 
have worn off. Considering that life in 
IS land is not a bed of roses, this could 
start happening soon with those who 
have been there for a few months. 
The danger posed by the first group 
is obvious. But even with the second 
group, there is no guarantee that 
unhappiness with poor living conditions 
implies an ideological change. Such 
people could return to South Africa 
but continue promoting the same 
ideology and ideas they had been 
recruited to. The dangers inherent in 
this could impact on both the state and 
South African society more generally, 
and the Muslim community more 
specifically.
Conclusion
In general, countering IS requires 
action on a number of fronts, including 
the military one. One front that is not 
located exclusively in the Middle East 
is that of confronting IS’s ideological 
attraction. The objective of this 
theological battle is to confront IS 
soft power projection into Muslim 
communities around the world. This is 
a crucial battle to be engaged in South 
Africa, and South Africa’s Muslim 
community seems to have expressed a 
willingness to be on the frontline.
Such recruitment of Muslims from 
various parts of the Muslim world is one 
of three criteria that IS has set itself as 
measures of its success; the other two 
being the ability to maintain control 
over the core of the territory it has 
captured, and being able to provide 
services to the population it rules over 
on an ongoing basis. Indications are 
that on all three of these indicators it is, 
thus far, doing fairly well. Thus, by IS’s 
own measure, it is succeeding. Frankly, 
there are no alternate criteria that have 
been set by anyone else – including its 
enemies and rivals – to measure the 
group’s success or failure. This suggests 
that there is little likelihood that IS will 
be destroyed within the next decade. 
Even if various governments, Muslim 
scholars, activists, and militant groups 
like the Kurdish militias succeed in 
stemming the flow of glassy-eyed 
recruits to IS-controlled Syria and 
Iraq, it is entirely plausible that, with 
the forces it has, IS could protect its 
territorial gains and provide services to 
its subjects. In essence, there is a real 
possibility that the ‘Islamic State’ could 
transform itself into a state.
An effective counter to the group’s 
control of territory cannot only be 
military. The other two indicators – 
stemming its recruitment and making 
it impossible for it to provide services 
(or ensuring that its subjects are not 
satisfied with the services it provides) 
will require interventions beyond the 
military; this is where soft power is 
necessary. Without such interventions, 
IS will ‘remain’ for a long time yet; 
even if it does not ‘expand’. ■
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